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Abstract—The current onion routing implementation of Tribler works
as expected but throttles the overall throughput of the Tribler system.
This article discusses a measuring procedure to reproducibly profile the
tunnel implementation so further optimizations of the tunnel community
can be made. Our work has been integrated into the Tribler eco-system.
INTRODUCTION
Any sense of privacy on The Internet is an illusion.
Even Tor, which could be considered the most privacy
preserving networking framework in existence, has its
flaws [3]. Furthermore, privacy-enhancing technology is
difficult to use for normal users and it slows down The
Internet. For instance, should one first setup a VPN and
then Tor or Tor and then VPN? Getting it wrong might
actually negatively impact a user’s privacy1.
With yearly sales of smartphones and smart watches
approaching one billion, threats to user privacy are be-
coming a global phenomenon. People can be traced to
a location within (in the worst case) 20 meters in real-
time23 and recognized [1]. With these billions of people
facing threats ranging from targeted advertisement to
burglary or even harassment, the need for scalable and
light-weight privacy-enhancing technology becomes ap-
parent. However, no optimized implementation of a scal-
able architecture exists in this emerging research field.
We provide a key step forward by identyfing bottlenecks
in Tribler.
The Tor project4 aims to offer anonymity by forward-
ing traffic through a series of relays. Multiple layers of
encryption are utilized such that no single relay can
reconstruct the entire circuit. This is also called onion
routing. These relays are provided by volunteers which
means there is often not enough bandwidth available
causing the Tor network to be slow; almost no-one uses
it for everyday browsing.
The solution is to make everyone in the network a
relay for others [2]. Several implementations of such an
1. https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TorPlusVPN
2. http://buddy-locator.com/
3. http://www.mobile-scan.com/
4. https://www.torproject.org/
Fig. 1. Download speed per amount of hops
approach are available, for instance, Tribler5 and Hola6.
Their architecture allows them to scale to both a large
number of users and high-bandwidth applications such
as HD video streaming.
The key contribution of this article is a performance
analysis of the first implementation of Tor-derived
onion routing implementation with user-donations,
NAT/firewall puncturing and fully decentralized peer
discovery: Tribler. To make our test realistic we procured
various anonymous private servers in exotic locations
such as Belize and Noord-Holland.
PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
The current onion routing implementation can find a
2 hop path between the piece of information needed
and the current computer running Tribler. It also allows
building circuits of variable length, but this is currently
not used as it severely limits the throughput of down-
loads. This was demonstrated by an experiment in 2014
among Tribler users. In this experiment dozens of users
downloaded a 50 MB file using the tunnel code from
a 1 Gbps server7. The results of this experiment can be
5. https://tribler.org/
6. https://hola.org/
7. http://forum.tribler.org/viewtopic.php?f=2&t=2121
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observed in Figure 1. However, it was unknown what
the limiting factors were. Possible culprits included the
openssl library calls, the single core processing, the IO
capacity or the network bandwidth.
EXPERIMENT SETUP
The contents of this section are as follows. First it will
explain the high-level construction of the node network
in the experiment. Secondly the frameworks that were
used are introduced. Lastly the limitations and practical
details of our setup are discussed.
In this experiment a small community of nodes is
created. An example of one such circuit in this network
is shown in Figure 2 and consists of a:
• Seeding node, sending data
• Exit node, relaying the unencrypted data to the sink
• Sink node, receiving all of the data from the Seed-
ing node
• Relay node, relaying encrypted packets within a
circuit
An experiment run consists of the seeding node con-
structing 4 different circuits using 0 to 3 hops (relay
nodes + 1 exit node), to send to the sink node. Each
of these circuits are built and destroyed independently
of each other. After building the circuits, some random
data is sent between the first and last node in the
circuit. The circuit with 0 hops just encrypts and decrypts
information on the same node. This allows us to run the
experiment without network overhead. At the end of the
run the results are evaluated per node type.
Dispersy [4] allows for decentralized communities
of nodes to communicate using custom protocols. The
tunnel community in Tribler is one of these Dispery
communities. Through the implementation of the tunnel
community, nodes can announce, discover and share
candidate exit nodes and relays. In the experiment of
this paper a single instance of the Tribler tunnel com-
munity is created without the support of other Tribler
functionalities.
Gumby is the experiment runner for the Tribler project.
It allows for creating repeatable tests that can spawn
instances on different computer setups, for example run-
ning all Tribler instances on different DAS4 computers
or running it all locally. To provide this functionality
it uses high level scenarios which interact with python
boilerplate code to interact with core Tribler functional-
ity. This paper has expanded upon Gumby by creating
a scenario for testing the tunnel implementation with
various numbers of hops and circuits and providing
the python boilerplate code for running this scenario
using either random packet transmission or LibTorrent
controlled packet transmission over the tunnel’s circuits.
Yappi8 is the profiler used to obtain the profiling
information from the application while the application is
running. Yappi is designed to support multi-threaded ap-
plications and be started and stopped without affecting
the application, which makes it the suited debugger for
the Tribler components. Depending on the configuration,
it returns the amount times a function was called and
either the wall time or cpu time per function.
To understand the timing of the tunnel component
we utilized Yappi’s CPU time reporting and filtered
the results to only include function calls related to the
tunnel implementation. These results per function are
then sorted and plotted relatively in a pie chart and
plotted absolutely in a bar graph using R scripts.
Due to budget and time constraints the experiment has
only been run on a single machine, running 8 instances of
Tribler. This approach places extra strain on the system
resources, but this should be of no consequence when
interpreting the relative results of function performance.
This also means that packets do not travel over the wild
internet in the experiment (instead they bounce back
from the on-site router). However, delays imposed due
to packets having a longer transmission time should not
matter for the performance of the implementation. In
fact, if these transmission delays impact the time spent
in functions, one could argue that this does not measure
the core performance of the function and thus gives a
skewed result of its performance.
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The initial observervation to be made when interpreting
the results is the fact that the seeding node is influenced
the most by the increasing number of hops. As the num-
ber of hops increased per run, the cryptographic com-
ponent of the seeding node (encrypt str and crypto out)
started to take a greater toll on its performance (see
Figure 3 and Figure 4). This is in contrast to the relay
and exit nodes which appeared to not differ at all (per-
formance wise) as the number of hops increased. This
result is in line with the onion routing model, as the
8. https://code.google.com/p/yappi/
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Fig. 4. Relative CPU time per function of the seeding
node for 3 hops and 4 circuits
seeding node is in charge of encrypting a packet multiple
times, for each hop in a circuit. The exit and relay nodes
only need to decrypt this packet once and forward it to
another node.
To better explain and distinguish the different results
we shall categorize the functions into two seperate func-
tionally similar groups. This is mainly done to provide
abstraction over the circuit implementation, where func-
tions might perform the same functionality but in a
different setting (like send packet for the seeding node
and relay packet for the exit/relay nodes). The first group
we distinguish is the crypto set. This group contains
the functions that pertain to encryption or decryption
of messages. The functions contained in this first cat-
egory are the encrypt str, decrypt str, encode address, de-
code address and crypto out functions. The second group
is the networking set. This group contains functions that
handle creating and sending the actual UDP packages
over the internet. The functions of this category are the
send packet and relay packet functions. All of the other
functions we assign to the other set.
0 Hops 3 Hops Exit
encrypt str 0.18 0.28 0.00
decrypt str 0.00 0.00 0.15
encode address 0.06 0.04 0.00
decode address 0.08 0.05 0.05
crypto out 0.12 0.15 0.00
0.44 0.53 0.20
TABLE 1
The relative processing times of the crypto set of
functions
0 Hops 3 Hops Exit
send packet 0.13 0.10 0.08
relay packet 0.00 0.00 0.11
0.13 0.10 0.19
TABLE 2
The relative processing times of the network set of
functions
What can be observed when analyzing this data is that
the crypto set’s functions take up the most time. The sec-
ondmost impactful functions are those of the networking
set. As seen in Table 1 and Table 2 these two sets of
functions take more than 50% of the CPU time for tunnel
community code in the seeding experiment. In the exit
node they use almost 40% of the CPU time. From this we
can conclude that the tunnel components which would
benefit most of parallellization are these two classes of
functions. Also we note that this is not an easy task since
these two classes are mostly reliant on external libraries
in Tribler’s implementation. Parallelizing functions in
the other set might not be a good idea though as the
parallelization overhead might outweigh the execution
times of the functions. This is of course dependent on the
machine Tribler is being executed on, but if one considers
smartphones as the targeted platform for optimization,
this would indeed be a bad idea.
From Figure 3 and Figure 4 it can be observed that the
encode address and decode address take a lot of CPU time.
After manual inspection it has been determined that the
encode address function is concerned with converting IP
strings to a binary format. Because of their repeated use,
these results can be cached to save time. One way to do
this, would be to save the converted IP strings in their
binary format. When decode address is observed, we see
that this method could also be used for reverse lookups
of host and port tuples. Better yet, for both functions,
would be to only work with the binary encoded ad-
dresses in the entirety of the tunnel community and only
convert them to string format when it is really needed
(like user interactions).
Lastly we can look to optimizations that can be done to
speed up the onion routing encryption, which responds
the worst to scaling up the amount of hops. This is not
something that can be fixed by using normal simple
parallelization however, but due to the fact that onion
routing requires successive RSA encryptions on the same
4packet. The only way to speed this up, is to perform
pipelined header encryption. However, this would re-
quire a great amount of control over Python’s packet
compression and encryption library. Even though this
would aid performance, most of a normal PC’s resources
will already be in use thanks to the parallelism of the
different circuits being used.
On a more course grained scope of parallellization we
have found, after inspecting the source code of Tribler,
that sending or relaying occurs sequentially after the
encryption and decryption of a packet. If this process
was pipelined perfectly, the results show a speedup to
15.46% for the 0 hop and 10.99% for the 3 hop seeding
node experiment and a speedup of 12.5% for the exit
node experiments. This pipelining could be achieved by
usage of transmission buffers or a thread-safe double
ended queue, which store encrypted packets awaiting
to be sent by another thread. In contrast to the per-
function parallellization this would be relatively trivial to
implement, but a significant improvement nonetheless.
One quirk in the results is the total amount of time
spent in the functions of the seeding node. The exper-
iments showed that as the number of hops increased,
the total time spent in the functions of the seeding node
decreased. It is speculated that this is due to some form
of load balancing among the nodes. This would be due
to the node processes being allocated to different cores
on the simulating machine. The exact remains a mystery
and a target for future work.
The exact total runtimes for the top 20 functions in
the seeding node and exit node experiments can also be
found in Figure 5 and Figure 6 respectively.
FUTURE WORK
The next step in this research would be to utilize LibTor-
rent to send packets over the circuits. This would enable
our experiment to utilize rate limiting and measure
packet loss overhead. At the moment our implementa-
tion does not consider packet loss, in other words it is
sending UDP packets blindly. This means packets that
are received by the sink node are being dropped instantly
and common occurrences such as packet retransmissions
are not measured. One thing to keep in mind, is that
using LibTorrent should not offer any new insights into
throughput loss. This is because LibTorrent is concerned
with the contents of the data that is being sent over the
circuits and not how the tunnel implementation sends it
over the network. The measurements performed by the
experiment in this paper are only on the actual tunnel
implementation and not on the functions that handle
the received data. Thus, whereas this might change the
absolute time spent in different functions, the relative
time spent should remain the same.
CONCLUSION
In this paper we have evaluated the performance of the
implementation of a privacy preserving communication
protocol in a maturing application called Tribler. We have
successfully tapped into and analyzed function calls in
this implementation, both manually and using measur-
ing frameworks. Our results have uncovered two sets of
functions where there is major room for improvement by
way of different forms of parallelization. We have found
that these sets consists of functions concerned with (1)
sending packets and (2) encrypting packets. Furthemore
we found that these two categories of bottleneck func-
tions are of more or less equal size, with the encryption
of packets taking only slightly longer than the sending
of packets. Our work has been made a standard part
of the Tribler ecosystem and will be used for further
optimizations like multi-core support.
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Fig. 5. Absolute time spent for different (#hops, #circuits) experiments for the seeding node
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Fig. 6. Absolute time spent for different (#hops, #circuits) experiments for the exit node
